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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Psychology and Religious Bias

In the last half century, psychologists
and other social

scientists have played a leading role in
our culture's efforts
to curb prejudice.

Long before the general public was concerned

about ethnic prejudice, psychologists were
studying it as
a social problem (e.g., Katz & Braly,
1933).

Psychologists

have often been first to advocate social policies such
as
affirmative action or the adoption of non-sexist language.

Despite this longstanding commitment to tolerance, research
has found that psychologists, too, sometimes evidence biases.
In the past, most research of this nature has explored whether

clinicians hold class, race, or sex biases.

However, recently,

evidence of another sort or bias, anti-religious bias, has

been reported.
1)

A brief review of that literature finds:
Religion and religious people have been

described in a predominantly negative
fashion in the psychological literature
(see Gartner, 1982 for a review)

,

though

recently the literature has reflected a
shift away from this monolithically

1

.

.

negative stance (Bergin, 1983; Saffady,
1976)
2)

Research on psychologists finds them to

be unusually anti-religious.
(Nix,

1978)

One study

found that 15% to 40% of the

psychologists studied reported antireligious attitudes, depending on how one

defined the term.

This is a dramatically

higher figure than has been found among the
general American population (Princeton

Religious Research Center, 1982).

While the

general tendency for the educated to be less

favorable towards formal/traditional religion
(Argyle & Beit-Hallami, 1975)

is undoubtedly

a factor, it does not explain the entire
discrepancy.

Physical Scientists, v^o have

an equal amount of education, have been found
to evaluate religion more favorably than social

scientists (Hoge & Keeter, 1976)

.

Moreover,

psychologists have been found to be the most
anti-religious of the social scientists
(McClintock, 1965)
3)

A number of religious psychologists have

claimed that the field is anti-religious,
stigmatizing those who hold religious beliefs

3

(Bergin, 1980, 1983; Clement, 1978;
Soiled,
1978; Van Leeuwen, 1983; Vitz, 1977).
4)

Several authors have argued that many of

the widely used personality tests are biased

against religious people (Bergin, 1983;
Gartner, 1981, 1983: Goldsmith & Harrig, 1978;

Goldsmith & Sandbom, 1982; Vitz, 1982).
5)

Content-Analysis of psychology texts

reveal that religious experience and behavior
is rarely discussed, despite the fact that

over 3/4 of the world is religious in some

fashion (Spika

&

Goldsmith, 1981; Vitz, 1982b).

Perhaps the most important question is how might
psychologists' religious attitudes affect their professional

conduct toward religious individuals?

Nix (1978) found that,

v^ile 15-40% of her sample was anti-religious, only 1% said
they would attempt to discourage a client's religious belief,

which suggests that psychologists may well be able to respect
their client's beliefs.

On the other hand, Gartner (1982)

found, in an analogue study on clinical psychology graduate

admissions, that professors of clinical psychology were less

likely to admit a Born Again Christian applicant and an identical

non-religious applicant.

This suggests that religious bias

may affect some professional decisions.

A particularly important professional decision

vvhich

4

psychologists frequently make is a judginent
concerning a client's

degree of psychopathology.

m

the last 20 years this process

has come under great scrutiny, both because
of the great impact
it can have on clients' lives, and because
of the great potential

for bias in what is in part a subjective
judgment.

The aim

of this study is to assess the extent to which
psychologists'

clinical judgment may be influenced by a patient's
ideological
orientation.

Relevant literature on bias in clinical judgment

and values and psychotherapy are reviewed below.

Clinical Judgment Studies

The suspicion that prejudice might influence therapists'

clinical judgments is not new.

Attention to the problem was

first aroused by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) who found

that lower class patients were more often assigned psychotic

and other severe diagnoses than upper and middle class patients.
This, plus the criticisms of labeling theorists and others

such as Thomas Szaz (1974) about the diagnostic process, and
the concern of the burgeoning community mental health movement
for the delivery of quality mental health services to the

poor served to make this a major issue in the field (Abramowitz
&

Dokecki, 1977).

Research has focused on the influence of

such factors as social class, race, sex and values on clinical

decision making. The influence of religion, till now, has

.
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been ignored, though the methods
used in these previous studies
could easily be adapted for research
of this type.
Clinical judgment research can be
almost exclusively

divided into two groups:

archival and analogue type studies

(Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977).

Archival, or as they are sometimes

called, epidemiological studies, involve
examining the records

of a mental health institution to see if
differences can be
found in the classification and treatment of
socially marginal
people.

For example, it has been found that lower class
patients

are more often given severe diagnoses, less often
accepted
for psychotherapeutic treatment and usually seen for fewer

sessions (Myers & Schaffer, 1954; Winder

&

Hersko, 1955)

The problem with such research is that positive findings are
consistent with, rather than univocally supportive of the
bias explanation.

These results may also reflect genuine

differences between the classes in severity of pathology and
resistance to psychological services.

As the data is

correlational, questions of causation remain moot.

One solution

to this dilemma is to include therapist characteristics as
a variable in the study.

For example, Yamamoto et al.

found that therapists

were high in prejudice were less

v*io

(1967)

likely to have black patients in their long-term caseload.

Results of this sort make one more confident in concluding

that prejudice has, in some cases, exerted an influence on
clinical judgment.

Unfortunately few studies include such

.

.
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factors

The second major research strategy,
the analogue study,

borrows its methodology from experimental
social psychology.

Clinicians are given case material in
v^ich possible elicitors

of bias (e.g., class, race, etc.) are
systematically varied.
For example, clinicians were found to
evaluate patients more

negatively on the basis of their Rorschach protocols
v^en
they were led to believe that the responses were
produced

by lower class patients (Levy

& Kahn.

1970).

With this type

of research, we can be more certain that clinicians'
evaluations
are being influenced by knowledge of the hypothetical patient's

group membership, as all other factors are held constant.
In this way analogue studies are better controlled than archival

studies.

Inasmuch as they involve the systematic manipulation

of variables they are experimental rather than correlational,

and causal conclusions are more easily drawn.

On the other

hand, analogue studies do not measure "real life" behavior,

as archival studies do.

People do not always behave as their

responses on a questionnaire might suggest (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1977)

.

For this reason it is sometimes thought that converging

evidence of bias fron both archival and analogue studies is
more convincing than either source alone (Abramowitz

&

Dokecki,

1977)

Analogue studies face another problem.

Though positive

results suggest that the clinician is responding to the

7

hypothetical patient's group membership,
they do not assure
us that prejudice is at work.

In an analogue study the clinician

is given relatively meager information
compared to that he

might normally have.

Using his knowledge of the rate of mental

illness in a particular population, he
may allow that information

to in fact guide his "best guess" about
the case (Abramowitz
&

Dokecki, 1977).

Put in statistical terms, he is in part,

using the group mean to maximize his chances of
being correct.
As with the archival studies, one way to manage the
problem
is to study therapist factors.

Abramowitz et al.

(1973)

found

that conservative clinicians were more likely to stigmatize

a political dissident.

Results of this sort suggest that

clinicians are not simply using well known statistical norms
to guide their decisions, but are in fact affected by bias.

Listed in Charts

1

and 2 are some of the stimuli and

dependent variables v\^ich have been used in past analogue
studies.

By far the most commonly used stimuli is a written

case history on client description.

Most dependent variables

consist of bipolar rating scales of some kind, usually devised

by the experimenter.

Questions concerning diagnosis, prognosis,

pathology and treatment recommendations are the most common
dependent variables.

Below is a list of dependent variables used by Wallach
and Strupp (1960) though some are redundant with variables

already mentioned, the entire group are listed here, because

CHART 1
(based on review by Abramowitz & Dokecki,
1972)

Stimuli Us ed in Analogue Studies of Clinical
Judgment
History/ description
Test data (e.g., personality test score
Rorschach protocols)
Audiotaped interviews
Videotaped interviews
Live interview
Interview transcript
Adjective description
Family history/ description
Group therapy incident
Gender

CHART 2
(based on review by Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977,
except v^ere indicated)

Dependent Variables Used in Analogue Studies
of Clinical Judgment
Diagnosis
Prognosis
Open-ended personality description
Personality rating scale
Semantic differential
Treatment recommendations
Family diagnostic evaluation
Open-ended therapeutic response to videotaped session
Educational and vocational oriented indicators
Adjective check list
Manifest need list
Frequency of encouraging statements made in role play
Frequency of "relationship building" statements
Severity of disturbance (Koppel & Farina, 1971)
Recommendation for discharge (Koppel & Farina, 1971)
Need for hospitalization (Blake, 1973)
Likability (Stein et al., 1972)
Discomfort with patient (Stein et al., 1972)
Interest in treating (Stein et al., 1972)
Potential for treatment (Blake, 1973)
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tneir scale is the most comprehensive
currently in the literature:
Diagnosis
Ego strength
Anxiety
Ego strength
Insight
Emotional maturity
Social adjustment
Degree of disturbance
Similarity to patients now have in therapy
Kind of treatment recommended
Motivation
Chance of acting out
Recommended frequency of sessions
Would you make extensive changes in character
structure
Recommended length of treatment
Permissiveness
Encourage free association
Change usual therapeutic approach
Recommendations to patient
Prognosis with therapy
Prognosis without therapy
Willingness to accept patient into treatment
Ease of empathy with patient
Environmental stress
Therapists' attitude

There is not room here to fully review the results found
in this literature (see Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977; Gurman
& Razin,

1977)

A brief overview is enlightening.

.

The first

patient attribute intensively studied with these techniques

was social class.

More than any other factor studied since,

social class was found to have a consistent effect on clinical
judgment:

"...research suggests that lower class individuals

are clinically devalued more consistently than are minority
persons, women or social nonconformists" (Abramowitz
1977, p. 464)

.

&

Dokecki,

These findings are consistent with literature

on what has been called the YAVIS (Young, Attractive, Verbal,

10

Intelligent, Successful) Client.

Research (Garfield

&

Bergin,

shows that this type of patient,
v^o is of course

1978)

disproportionately represented among the
upper classes, is

preferred by most therapists and tends
to benefit most from
psychological services.

The prediction that clinicians would
evaluate racial

minorities more negatively than caucasions has
not been

substantiated (Abramowitz

&

Dokecki, 1977; Sattler, 1977).

Both archival and analogue studies have failed to
show a consistent
anti-black bias.

The majority of studies produced null results.

Some have found pro-black responses among white and black
clinicians.

Anti-black findings are the most rare.

One of

the few studies to find that blacks were given a more severe

diagnosis admittedly used a highly ambiguous case (Blake,
1973)

.

Even in this study subjects did not differentiate

the black and v*iite patient on such variables as adequacy
of ego function, interest in treating or prognosis.

While clear-cut bias has not been found, there is evidence
that clinicians attend to race vdien making clinical judgments.

Goldstone (1971), for example, found that blacks were rated
better than v^ites if both were described as "good therapy
risks" but worse if both vere described as "poor risks."

The investigator concludes that minority status is seen as

a handicap; therefore, if a black is a good risk he must be

exceptionally able in order to overcome his handicap.

If
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he is a "poor risk" then he most
likely is in worse shape
than a comparable white patient
who does not have an extra
impediment.
It is also possible that the clinicians
participating

in such studies are "wise" to the
analogue method and thus,

bend over backwards to avoid appearing
prejudiced.

As Abramowitz

and Dokecki (1977) note, the studies in this
area are virtually

devoid of manifestation checks.
Though clinicians have been found to hold sex role
stereotypes
(Rabkin, 1977)

,

there has been little support for the notion

that they are biased against women (Abramowitz & Dokecki,
1977)

.

As with minorities, however, clinicians have been

found to respond differently to female clients.

Male clinicians

actually tend to prefer their female patients and see them
for more sessions.

However, that extra degree of interest

sometimes has sexual ized or voyeuristic overtones (Abramowitz
& Dokecki,

1977).

For example, psychiatric residents show

more TAT cards concerning romantic themes to women (Mas ley
& Harris,

1969; Siskind, 1973).

One study worth noting did

find bias against women using neither the archival or analogue
method.

Broverman et al.

(1970)

found that clinicians' ratings

of the ideal man were closer to their ratings of the ideal

person than were their ratings of the ideal woman.

Next to patient social class, patient's values have most
consistently been found to affect clinicians' judgmentation

.
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(Abramowitz & Dokecki, 1977).

area have been mixed.

However, even results in this

Of the ten studies reviewed by Abramowitz

and Dokecki (1977), three found
positive results, three null
findings, and four mixed results.

They report two studies

(Abramowitz et al., 1973; Braginski & Braginski,
1974) which

reported bias against the political dissident,
especially
ainong Conservative clinicians.

More mixed results on patient

sex type, which could be considered a value dimension,
have

been found.
& Steward,

Two studies (Schlosberg
1971)

&

Pietrofesa, 1973; Thomas

found that women contemplating masculine

occupations were judged more pathological.

However, another

set of investigators (Abramowitz et al., 1976) failed to replicate

these findings.

Yet another study found feminine typed women

elicited more empathy and liking than masculine typed, but
that the masculine typed were judged more mature (Gomes &

Abramowitz, 1976)

At least three studies on the influence of a client's

religious values on clinical judgment have been reported.

Using a sample of only three clinicians, Gerrard (1968) found
that they were more likely to predict that abnormal MMPI scores

came from a Christian snake-handling sect than a conventional
church, despite the fact that research has shown no difference

between these groups on the MMPI (Tellegen et al., 1969).
Clearly, more research is needed in the area of religious

values and clinical judgment.

However, Hong (1978) found

13

that seminary students did not
differ in their clinical ratings
in response to manipulations of
the client's religious orientation

or type of conversion.

l^wis (1983) found that clinicians

listening to a taped interview with a
depressed woman did

not differ in their ratings when the patient
used religious
language and was identified as an evangelical
Christian.

Perhaps the final question one might ask of
this literature
is "Why does it matter if prejudice influences
clinical judgment?"

There are several answers to this question.

First, as the

labeling theorists of the 1960 's were the first to point out,

diagnostic labels can have a stigmatizing effect on the
individual.

If clinicians are prone to assign more severe

labels to certain groups, that action has tangible political,

economic, social and psychological negative consequences for
the individuals in those groups.

Secondly, members of groups

not favored by psychologists may find the path to psychological
services they need partially blocked.

The reader will recall

that lower class patients, for exairple, are less often accepted
as patients, usually assigned to less skilled personnel and

seen for fewer sessions than middle or upper class patients
(Myers & Shaeffer, 1954; Winder & Hersko, 1955)

.

More tangible,

but no less important, how will the therapist's attitude toward
the patient affect his ability to provide his normal level
of quality services?
wrote:

Concerning this question, Hans Strupp
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...in all the investigations the
therapist's
attitude toward the patient as rated
by
himself showed a highly significant
statistical
relationship to his clinical judgments
and treatment plans, and v^ere
such data
was obtained, to the emotional
tones of
his communications, in recent studies,
an item v^iich inquired whether the
therapist
felt warmly toward the patient proved
particularly predictive. For example,
negative attitudes toward the patient
were found to be correlated with a more
unfavorable diagnosis and prognosis, with
recommendations for greater strictness
and activity on the part of the therapist;
with recommendations for less frequent
interviews; with greater unwillingness
to treat him...
It is yet unknown to v*iat extent the patient
may fulfill the therapist's unverbalized

prophecy. This much, however, is clear.
In the absence of a keen and abiding interest
and dedication to the part of the therapist,
the patient cannot marshal the necessary
strength and energy to fight his way to
a healthier adaptation, or, to use Dr.
Alexander's felicitous term, he cannot
undergo a corrective emotional experience.
(Strupp, 1963, p. 78)

Further, therapists' negative attitudes towards marginal

groups may create/ interact with the defensiveness that some
members of those groups might feel

v*ien

entering therapy.

Relating this point to our topic. King (1978) found that only

a minute percentage of the Evangelical Christians in his sample
said they would consider seeking psychological services even
if they had a psychological problem.

The most common reason

subjects gave was their fear that the therapist would misunderstand

or challenge their faith.

When one considers

tliat

Evangelical

Christians compose 17% of this nation's population (Princeton

15

Religious Research Center, 1982)

becomes apparent.

,

the scope of the problem

Put in this context, it appears to be
of

more than academic interest to
discover if psychologists are

biased in their clinical judgments of
the religious.

Values and Therapy

Between the late fifties and early seventies,
psychologists
showed a great deal of interest in the relationship
of values
to therapy.
& Weiner,

Reviews of the literature (Beutler, 1972; Ehrlich

1961; Kessell & McBrearty, 1967; Patterson, 1959)

appear to converge on four basic findings, each of which has
implications for our topic.

!•

In many cases therapists appear to communicate their
values to their patients
It has long been a truism that therapists should not

"impose their values" on their clients.

grew out of psychoanalytic theory

Initially, this position

vdiich argued that any attempts

at moral persuasion would interfere with the interpretive
process.

This stance of value neutrality was later buttressed

by the emergence of the client centered approach

vAiich emphasized

the therapist's non-directive role in helping the client to

choose his own values.
In the late fifties and early sixties, however, psychologists

and other clinicians began to question whether the noble goal

"
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of value neutrality was really
possible in the context of
the therapeutic relationship.

Beutler (1972) and Kessell

and McBrearty (1967) cite almost a
hundred authors writing
during this period v^o came to the conclusion
that it was

not possible,

indeed, as early as 1953, the American
Psychological

Association explicitly state in their code of
ethics that
the values of the psychotherapist are expressed
in the clinical
relationship.

Wolf (1956) found that 40% of his New York

therapist sample believed that the values of the therapist

have direct influence on the client.

Only 25% denied it.

In a more recent survey (Roche Labs, 1974)

,

65% of the

psychiatrists polled agreed that "Psychiatrists attempt to
influence patients to 'adjust' to the psychiatrists' own [sex

role ] stereotypes .
The conclusion that the values of the mental health

professional are inevitably expressed to the patient rests

on two arguments.

First, as London (1964)

,

among others,

has suggested, the goals of psychotherapy itself rests on
implicit value assuitptions

.

Some clinicians have obscured

this point in the past by describing abnormality and treatment
in the language of the medical model.

Such an analogy inplies

that mental health, like physical health, can be defined in

objective terms, v\^en in fact psychological theories of "the
Good," to borrow Plato's term, are usually based on untested

and often untestable value assumptions.

One theory's concept

.
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of health may not agree with others.
The second argument is that therapists
communicate their

values indirectly, sometimes unconsciously,
even if they refrain
from directly imposing them.

It is widely acknowledged by

psychologists that people communicate a great
deal about themselves
in a variety of verbal and nonverbal
ways that they may not

recognize or be able to control.

We can only conclude that

this must also be true of psychologists themselves
and their
values.

Meehl (1959) provides an example:
I think it is naive to assume that because
a therapist does not explicitly assert
to his patient that he, the therapist,
has certain views about religion, or values
or philosophy of life, therefore he is
not presenting to the patient any value
model. Surely one does not have to engage
in conversation regarding his own moral
philosophy in order to get across the
message

Consider, for example, the problem of
guilt for one's thoughts. There are important
(and psychologically significant) differences
here between Roman Catholics, Lutherans
and Humanists. To a Lutheran, objective
guilt does attach to evil thoughts. To
a Roman Catholic, objective guilt attaches
to evil thoughts only under certain conditions
(e.g., v*ien the individual freely dwells
on them instead of struggling against
them) .
To most Humanists thoughts vAiich
do not result in overt actions are free
of guilt. I have listened to enough tape
recordings to believe that in reflection,
interpretation or leading questions regarding
a patient's thoughts, therapists often
tip their hand, by inflection or choice
of words as to v^ere they stand in this
regard: A message v^ich says "Come now,
you and I are both rational, mature,
emancipated individuals, and therefore

18

we know that a person ought not feel
guilty
about his fantasies.

(Meehl,

1959, pg. 256)

The hypothesis v*iich follows from
this discussion is

that some therapists may communicate
values antithetical to
those of their clients, especially v^en
their client subscribes
to an extreme ideological belief system.

Though there are

numerous anecdotes which have been told to the
author which
are consistent with this hypothesis, it has never
been tested
empirically.

Nix's (1978) finding that only one percent of

her sample claimed that they discourage the religious beliefs
of their clients, suggest that the attempted value influence

may not be of a conscious overt nature.

Almost half of her

sample said they would "explore" the client's religious beliefs.
As in the above example provided by Meehl, the therapist's

own views may seep through in this "exploration process."

2.

Patients tend to adopt their therapists' values
If therapists do indeed communicate their values, one

would expect that many patients might
those values.

iDe

receptive to adopting

Petoney (1966) found that outpatients at a

client centered counseling center at the University of Chicago

moved closer to their therapists' values during the course
of therapy.
in two ways.

Petoney suggested that his results could be explained
Either the therapist communicates his values

to the client, or the client as a result of therapy, acquires

a more mature healthy approach to living and hence approximates
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more closely the orientation of his
therapist.
Welkowitz, Cohen and Ortmeyer (1967) found
results more

consistent with the former explanation.

They found that patients

were closer in values to their own therapists
than were randomly
assigned therapist patient dyads, suggesting that
patients

are indeed adopting the values of their particular
therapist,
rather than general "healthy" therapist values.

(Initial

patient selection did not seem to be a factor, as therapists

were assigned cases by an intake worker on the basis of
availability.)

Others (Burdock et al., 1960; Morris et al.,

1960) have found that patients and therapists cannot be

distinguished on the basis of their values, further casting

doubt on the "healthy therapist values" hypothesis.
The competing notion that therapists may in fact be
influencing their patients' values is certainly consistent

with v^at social psychologists have discovered about the process
social influence.

Patients are troubled people seeking help

from an authoritative expert with vhom they will become quite
intimate; this should make them receptive to influence on

a number of counts.

Indeed, some authors have tried to explain

the entire process of psychotherapy in terms of the social

influence literature (Beutler, 1971; Strong, 1978).

Behavioral

principles might also be invoked to explain this phenomenon.

Truax (1966) analyzed transcripts from client centered therapy
and noticed that the therapists selectively reinforced with
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a supportive remark or gesture
statements v^ich were consistent

with the humanistic world-view after
v^^ich the frequency of
such verbal behavior increased.
Undoubtedly, more research is needed on how,
why and

when client's values change to draw any firm
conclusions.
It would be interesting to see if religious
clients become
less religious after therapy than a matched waiting
list control,

or to broaden the question, in

v^iat,

if any, way they would

change.

3.

Patients tend to be rated as more improved if they adopt
their therapist's values

The first study of this type was done by Rosenthal (1955)

who found that improved patients tended to revise their values
in the direction of the therapist.

Though he did not obtain

significant results on the Al Ipor t-Vemon-Lindzey scale of
values, he did on a moral values scale v*iich measured moral

beliefs concerning sex, aggression and authority.

This suggests

that some value content may be more closely associated with
rated improvement than others.

Obviously moral beliefs concerning

sex, aggression and authority are closely connected to religious

values (an examination of the actual items on the scale confirms
this, e.g., "Girls should come to the marriage bed as virgins,"
is a belief of traditional Judaism and Christianity)

.

The

fact that these were the values found to be relevant to therapeutic

outcome suggests that there is need for more empirical study

.

,

.
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of psychotherapy and religious
values.

Unfortunately, Rosenthal

does not report if improved patients
become more liberal or

conservative in their views, only that
they come closer to
the views of their therapist (not reported)

Tentative support for Rosenthal's findings
was found

by Parloff , Iflund and Goldstein (1957)

.

They asked two

psychiatric inpatients to rank the importance of
various issued

discussed in therapy.

The patient who was rated as most improved

and subsequently discharged became relatively closer in
his
rankings to those supplied by the therapist.

Schrier (1953)

though not directly concerned with values, found that reported
improvement was related to the extent that the patient developed

identification with the therapist's need system.

In v^at

is probably the most methodologically sound study in this

area, Welkowitz, Cohen and Ortmeyer (1967) found that therapists'

ratings of patient improvement was correlated with therapist

patient similarity on the Strong Vocational Interest Blank
and the Morris Way to Live Scale.

related study. Burdock et al.
vAio

Finally, in a somev^at

(1960)

found that therapists

adopted the interest patterns of their supervisors were

rated by their supervisors as better adjusted.

Partially contradictory findings were found in three
studies (Farson, 1961; Holzman, 1961; Nawas

&

Landfield, 1963)

Farson (1961) found adoption of the therapist's values to

be related to outcome only among less adjusted and less competent
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clinicians.

Kessel and McBrearty (1967) suggest that
the

difference in Parson's and Rosenthal's
findings may be due
to the fact that Rosenthal's sample was
composed of

psychoanalytically oriented psychiatric residents
while Parson
studied client centered therapists.

These two orientations

have different value systems themselves, with client
centered
therapists sometimes being more adamant about not influencing

client values.

One could also speculate that psychiatric

residents may not be the most competent clinicians.
(1961)

Holzman

found that successful outpatients tended to adopt their

therapist's values, but that the opposite was true of inpatients.
Finally, Nawas and Landfield (1963) reported nonsignificant

results which seemed contrary to those of Rosenthal.
v^ien

However,

they added more subjects to their sample (Landfield

&

Nawas, 1964) they indeed did find that improved patients tended

to shift their real self-ratings closer to the therapist's
ideal self-ratings, provided it was described in the patient's
language.

As with many of the other findings we have reviewed,

these are almost entirely correlational, and more than one

plausible explanation presents itself.

Taking these results

at face value, the acceptance of a therapist's values may
in some way be related to improvement in therapy.

be because the therapist's values are "healthier."

This may
An alternate

explanation is that increasing value congruence may be one
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cause/result of increased intimacy and
receptivity to therapeutic
influence,

if one wanted to be a bit nxDre
skeptical, one

could suggest that clients

adopt their therapists' values

may be rated as more improved without
actually being so, because
they now appear more attractive to the
therapist whose values
they have accepted.
(1955)

The fact that some studies such as Rosenthal

and Holzman (1961) have used outcome criteria
more

objective than therapists' ratings, such as independent
interviews,

personality tests or objective data, makes this explanation
less likely.

However, as some (Bergin, 1983; Gartner, 1981,

1983b; Goldsmith & Harrig, 1978; Goldsmith & Sandborn, 1982;

Vitz, 1982) have suggested, personality tests and "independent"

interviewers can share many of the therapists' value biases.
Thus, further analogue research on therapist-patient value

congruence and clinical judgment is needed to supplement these
correlational findings.

4.

Patients tend to improve more with therapists vho initially
share their values to a moderate degree and do worse
with therapists v^o are highly dissimilar
The research reviewed above examined the relationship

between value change during therapy and therapy outcome.
Research has also been done on the effect of initial
therapist-patient value similarity on outcome.

Cook (1966)

had prospective clients at a college counseling center and
their clinical staff fill out the Al Iport-Vemon-Lindzey scale
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of values.

He then assigned clients to
either a high, medium

or low similarity therapist.

He discovered a curvilinear

relationship between similarity and
outcome.

His results

showed that clients working with
a medium similarity therapist

did the best, followed by the high
similarity group, with
the low similarity group doing the
worst.

This finding is

paralleled by others (Berzin, 1977) v^ich
have found a curvilinear

relationship between patient-therapist personality
similarity
and therapy outcome.

Perhaps too high a degree of similarity

makes it hard for the therapist to be objective,
as his own
conflicts and biases may be confounded with those of
the patient.

On the other hand, too little similarity may make it difficult
for the therapist to empathize with the client or for the

client to trust the therapist.

A substantial number of authors

agree that a high degree of value dissimilarity is an impediment
to therapy (Beutler, 1972).

On this basis, one might predict

that highly religious patients might not improve as much in

psychotherapy as less religious patients.

Rosenbaum et al.

(1956)

discovered just that.
In a more recent study (Pettit, Pettit & Welkowitz, 1974)

no relationship was found between value similarity and duration
of therapy though they used a large sample (104 therapists,
249 patients)

.

The investigators used factor analysis to

consolidate six major interest factors from several measures
(Rotary Club vs. aesthetic interest, authoritarian submission
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vs. independent, transcendentalism
vs. concrete rational).

Is Religi on Hazardous to Your
Mental Health ?

One of the most important criticisms
of analogue research

on clinical judgment has been that
clinicians' ratings may

be influenced by their knowledge about the
rate of mental
illness in different populations, rather than
prejudice.
Thus, in proposing an analogue study on religion
and clinical

judgment, it is important to ask in advance, "Is there
a greater

rate of mental illness among the religious?"

For if there

is, our results may not be as easily interpretable.

A number of review articles on this topic can be found
in the psychological literature (Argyle

&

Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975;

Becker, 1971; Bergin, 1983; Dittes, 1971; Gartner, 1983b;
Sanua, 1969; Spilka & Werme, 1971; Stark, 1971).

The oven^elming

finding, perhaps to the chagrin of both the pro- and

anti-religious, is that the religious appear to be no more
or less healthy than the nonreligious.

As Sanua (1969) concludes:

"The results of the above review seem to indicate therefore,

that most studies show no relationship iDetween religion and
mental health..." (pg. 100).
(1983)

In a more recent review Bergin

summarizes his findings as follows:

The data provide surprising results.
Of the 30 effects tabulated, only 7 or
23% manifested the negative relationship
iDetween religion and mental health assumed
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by Ellis and others.

Forty-seven percent
indicated a positive relationship, and
30% a zero relationship. Thus 77% of
the obtained results are contrary
to the
negative effect of religion theory.
Although
most of the results were not statistically
significant, the overall pattern was
interesting. Considering statistical
significance of results, 23 outcomes showed
no significant relationship, 5 showed
a positive relationship and 2 showed a
negative relationship.
(Bergin, 1983,

pg. 176)

In reviewing the literature on religion and
self-esteem,

an important aspect of mental health, Gartner
(1983b) found

a remarkably similar distribution of results.

Of the 18 studies

reviewed, 4 found the religious lower in self-esteem,

no difference, and

6

8

found

found the religious higher in self-esteem.

As in Bergin 's review, exactly 77% of the findings are inconsistent

with the proposed negative relationship between religion and
mental health.

As our study concerns the traditionally religious in
particular, literature on this degree of adjustment is particularly
relevant.

In his review, Becker (1971) found three studies

v^ich compared theological liberals to theological conservatives.
Between the three studies a total of 18 personality tests

were administered to samples from these two populations, almost
vdiolly without results.

Becker concludes:

The attempts of Rank, Lee and Dreger to
establish personality substrata for theological
liberals and theological conservatives
should tell us that this is an unproductive
line of pursuit. .. .While liberalism and
conservatism may be the source of much
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friction in theological circles, the
content
of one's theology is apparently not
the
dimension on which to establish the
possible
correlates of psychological health.
(Becker,
1971, pg. 399)

Clearly, more research is needed in this
area, however.
Finally, one must ask if research has shown
differences

with respect to adjustment between subjects who
are more extremely
conservative in their theology, such as Evangelicals
and

Fmdamentalists, and those

v*io

are liberal or nonreligious.

Unfortunately, there is no review article on this topic to

the author's knowledge.

Goldsmith (1983) recently reviewed

the last decade of research v^ich appeared in The Journal
of Psychology and Theology
journal.

,

an Evangelically oriented psychological

He reports that "none of the studies reviewed reported

clear differences between (Evangelical) Christians and others

on general measures of personality or adjustment measures"
(pg.

15)

.

This author was able to find four relevant studies

in the psychological literature concerning the mental health

of Fundamentalists.

Stanley (1963a, 1963b) was unable to

find any difference between fundamentalist Christians and

non-fundamentalist Christians on the MPI measure of neuroticism
or the Cattel and Schrier (1961) Neuroticism scale questionnaire.
In a later study Stanley et al.

(1975)

coirpared fundamentalists

to secular college students on the Eysenck Personality Inventory

and found the religious students to be less neurotic.
(1978)

found the same results using the scale.

Hassan

Thus, the

.
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overall finding, once again,
appears to be that no consistent

direction of differences can be
found.
Going beyond the siniple question
of v^ether the religious
are more or less well adjusted
than the nonreligious, there
iray

be differences in their respective
types of adjustment.

There may be assets and liabilities
inherent in both life
styles

Beginning

vd.th

religion's liabilities, it has repeatedly

been found that the religious are more
"authoritarian" than
the nonreligious (Adomo et al., 1950; Dittes,
1971; Sanua,
1969; Simpson & Yinger, 1972; Spilka & Werme, 1971).

However,

some authors (Hogan & Emler, 1978; Gartner, 1983b) have
argued

that the F scale, the instrument used to measure authoritarianism,
is biased against subjects holding conservative and/or religious

values.

Thus, it is difficult to determine whether or not

these results are simply an artifact of the instrument used.

This appears to be a common problem

on religion and mental health.

v*ien

considering research

The traditionally religious

and psychologists, v^o are for the most part secular humanists,
have vastly different definitions of v^at constitutes mental
health.

However, because psychologists incorporate their

notions into personality tests, they appear somehow objective

and scientific.

If religious populations score poorly on

these tests, it is taken as evidence that they are impaired,

when they may simply hold different values.

As Bergin (1983)

29

has stated:
...mental health criteria ultimately
consist
of standards based on subjective
values
Thus, many of the "proofs" that
religion
IS a source of disturbance are
merely
tautologies that only prove that two sets
of personality measures constructed
by
people holding the same premises are likely
to correlate. This circularity is obscured
by an empirical posture.
(Bergin, 1983,
Pg. 172)

(For an example of such circularity see
Gartner (1981) v*io

found that widely reported results showing the
religious to

be less self-actualized than non-believers was a clear
artifact
of the instrument, the Personal Orientation Inventory,
which

was used in

ttiese studies.)

These objections noted, there is evidence from other
sources v^ich is consistent with Adorno et al.'s (1950) original

contention that the religious are more strongly defended,

closed minded and constricted in their personalities (Spilka
& Werme, 1971; Dittes,

1971).

For example, several studies

have found the religious to score higher on the MMPI L and
K scales (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Dittes, 1971; Martin
& Nichols,

1962)

,

considered to be measures of defensiveness.

More research, and more careful scrutiny of existing research
is needed in this area.

A large body of research has linked religion to prejudice
(Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975; Dittes, 1971; Simpson & Yinger,
1971)

.

(Whether prejudice can be considered a sign of poor

adjustinent is perhaps debatable.

This author will show his
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liberal bias and assume that it
is.)

However, a more recent

review by Gorsuch and Aleshire
(1974) has revealed that the
relationship is not so simple,

m

studies v^ere subjects

have been divided into intrinsically
and extrinsically religious,
the intrinsics have consistently been
found to be less prejudiced

than average, while the extrinsics are
consistently more
prejudiced.

This suggests that those

v*io

are personally committed

to their faith have genuinely internalized
its humanitarian
ideals, while those who go to church for material
advantages

or simply as part of an identification with "the American

way of life" are likely to adopt the American way of prejudice
as well.

Consistent with these findings, several studies

found a curvilinear relationship between prejudice and church
attendance.

Those

v*io

were least prejudiced either never

attended church or went more than once a week.

The "Sunday

morning" Christians were found to be the most prejudiced.
This pattern of findings was not replicated for fundamentalists,
viio

were found to be more prejudiced than others, regardless

of intrinsic-extrinsic orientation and degree of participation.
Unfortunately, Gorsuch and Aleshire (1974) do not report if

any of these studies controlled for education

V(diich

correlates

negatively with both prejudice and fundamentalism (Argyle
& Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975;

Simpson & Yinger, 1971).

In contrast, research has shown religion to be a psychological

asset in a number of different respects.

However, there are

31

questions concerning the interpretation
of these results as
well.

One problem is that simplistic
measures of religiosity

are often employed.

Sociologists of religion have devoted

a great deal of attention to the simple
question of how does
one measure religion? (Yinger, 1970).

Clock and Stark (1965),

for example, have divided religiosity into
five dimensions:
belief, practice, experience, knowledge, and
consequences.

Sometimes research employing different dimensions as
their

measure of religiosity will obtain different results.

For

example, church attendance (participation dimension) has been

found to correlate negatively with mental illness, physical
illness, suicide, criminal behavior and alcoholism (Argyle
& Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975).

and patients

v*io

However, juvenile delinquents, alcoholics

have attempted suicide do not differ from

others in their religious beliefs (Argyle
1975)

.

&

Beit-Hal lahmi,

It may be that religious faith is not enough to gain

the mental health benefits of religion.

Participation in

the religious community, v^ich provides support and structure
for the individual, may also be an essential element.

On

the other hand, one could argue that as people deteriorate

psychologically they drop out of organized social activities
like church.

As the data is correlational, questions of causation

cannot be determined.

A second line of research shows that the religious are
more likely to report being personally happy (Ellison

&

Paloutzian,
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1979), and satisfied with their marriages
(Argyle & Beit-Hal lahmi,
1975; Chesser, 1956; Dyer, 1961; Landis
& Landis, 1953).

The latter finding, in particular,
has been replicated numerous
times.

"In all the studies in which religious
variables have

been included, the more religious people
have claimed to be
more happily married.

The differences are not large, but

they are consistent" (Argyle

&

Beit-Hal lahmi, 1975, pg.

Such results are consistent with religion's claim to
meet
man's highest needs and its emphasis on positive family
life.
However, these results, too, must be interpreted with caution.
In light of the finding that the religious tend to "fake good"

or be more defensive on MMPI L and K scales, they might be
likely to paint an unreal istically rosy picture on self-report

scales concerning personal and marital happiness also.

One

is often encouraged to think and talk positive in religious

circles.

In addition, cognitive dissonance might cause many

religious to overestimate their marital happiness as religious

doctrine sometimes makes divorce difficult or impossible.
(A

religionist could respond to this argument by saying that

"learning" to be happy with one's spouse may often be preferable

to breaking up families.

Thus, the questions may be irresolvable

on the empirical level.)
It is clear that the conclusions one can draw from this

data are far from definitive.

The pro-religious reader could

conclude that, excepting the results obtained with a series
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of biased personality tests,
the religious came out ahead
on all the objective "real-^rld"
criteria (e.g., physical
illness, suicide, etc.).

The anti-religious reader, on the

other hand, could concede that
the religious gain some minor
benefits from leading "straight" and
"v^olesome" lives, but
argue that they pay for those benefits
through severe self-imposed
limitations on their emotional and
psychological functioning.

The truth may indeed be somewhere in-between.

The structure

provided by religion may be a double edged
sword which provides
support, endurance and security, but also
limitations and

sometimes rigidity.

The humanist may be more creative, but

he is also more likely to divorce, go insane, or commit
suicide.

Who is to say which is better?

This is a question to be answered

on the bases of values, not scientific inquiry.
One final way in v*iich one may examine the data is to
admit that the question, "Is religion (traditional or not)

good for your mental health?" is the wrong question.

We might

do better to try to differentiate ways of being religious
(traditionally or nontraditionally) v*iich are healthy from

those v^ich are not.
(1974)

For example, the Gorsuch and Aleshire

article cited earlier showed that intrinsic and extrinsic

religiosity have opposite relationships to prejudice.

Though

Gartner (1983) in his review found no relationship iDetween
self-esteem and religiosity, he did find a consistent positive

relationship between loving God images, as contrasted to judgmental
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ones, and self-esteem.

Psychologists may indeed be right

that the quality of one's mental
health is related to one's

religious beliefs.

Perhaps the field has spent too much
time

trying to damn or vindicate religion
as a v^ole to fully explore
v*iat these relationships might
be.

In summary, research has failed to
find any consistent

relationship between religion and mental health.

Thus, in

undertaking an analogue study on religion and
clinical judgment,
one does not need to be concerned that clinicians
will utilize

empirically valid norms as a factor in their decisions,
for

clear norms relevant to this question have yet to be found.

CHAPTER

II

OVERALL DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES

Overall Design

Doctoral level clinicians were
asked to read two patient

case histories.

(These two cases were pre- judged
by raters

to be similar.)

In one of these cases, the
patient was described

as holding an extreme ideological
orientation, while in the

other they were not.

Four orientations were systematically

varied between the two cases:

conservative religious, conservative

political, liberal religious, liberal
political,

in a sense,

the other three ideological groups serve as
controls for the

extreme conservative religious patient.

They allow us to

examine separately the impact of a patient's holding
to a

belief system which is
or

c)

a)

extreme, b) conservative or liberal,

religious or political.

Subjects also filled out a

brief questionnaire about their own demographic background
and ideological position.

Hypotheses

This study raises three basic questions, each with a

corresponding hypothesis or set of hypotheses.
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Question 1
Are patients viewed more negatively
if they hold an extreme
ideological orientation?

Hypothesis lA.

Patients holding an extreme ideological

position will be rated more negatively than
patients who do
not hold such an orientation.
Hypothesis IB.

Ideological patients will be assigned

more severe diagnoses.
be assigned

a)

Specifically, they will more often

DSM-III axis II diagnoses (American Psychiatric

Association, 1980)

,

and b) the diagnoses of obsessive compulsive

or compulsive personality disorder (recall Freud believed
religion to be an obsessive compulsive neurosis)

Question

2

Will clinicians differentiate between the four groups
in their ratings?

Three degrees of freedom allow for three

planned contrasts.
Hypothesis 2A

.

"Liberal vs. conservative" patients.

Given that most psychologists are liberals, the conservative
groups will be rated more negatively than the liberal groups.
Hypothesis 2B

.

"Religious vs. political" patients.

Given the long anti-religious tradition in psychology, religious
patients will be viewed more negatively than political ones.
Hypothesis 2C .
patients.

"Conservative religious vs. the other"

For both of the above reasons, the conservative

37

religious group will be rated
the nost negatively of all.

Question

3

Will the demographic and
ideological traits of the rater

interact with the ideology of
the patient in its effect on
the rater's responses?

Hypothesis 3A.

Politically liberal clinicians will
rate

conservative patients more negatively
than they will rate
liberal patients.

Conservative clinicians will react in the

opposite way.
Hypothesis 3B.

Religiously liberal clinicians will rate

conservative patients more negatively than liberal
patients.

Traditionally religious clinicians will react in the
opposite
way.

Hypothesis 3C .

Clinicians v^o themselves indicate an

extreme position on the political or religious ideology scales
will evidence the above effects more strongly than will moderates.

Hypothesis 3D .

Northeasterners , and possibly Californians,

who as groups tend to be more liberal, will react more negatively
to the conservative patients than will the rest of the country.

Hypothesis 3E .
1982)

,

Consistent with past findings (Gartner,

Jews will react more negatively to the conservative

religious patient

(a

fundamentalist Christian) and possibly

to conservative groups in general, than Gentiles.
Hypothesis 3F .

Inasmuch as psychoanalytically oriented

,
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clinicians are more prone to
infer pathology from behavior
which may not be overtly
symptomatic than are behaviorists

psychoanalytic clinicians will
react more negatively to the
ideological patients.
Hypothesis 3G.

Inasmuch as women are more
religious

than men as a group, women will
react less negatively to the

conservative religious patient than
men.
Hypothesis 3H .

Given the negative attitude most
conservative

groups have long held towards homosexuality,
homosexual clinicians
will react more negatively to conservative
patients and more

positively toward the liberals than heterosexuals.
In addition to the above hypotheses, the
influence of

therapist race, age and social class of origin
will be explored.

CHAPTER III
METHOD

Sample

The primary sample for this study
was a group of clinical

psychologists whose names were obtained from
the National

Register of Mental Health Service Providers .

Eighteen hundred

randomly chosen names were sent the study by
mail,

in an

effort to recruit a traditionally religious
subsample an additional
340 questionnaires were sent to a group of clinicians listed
in the Directory of the Christian Association for
Psychological

Studies.

CAPS is a professional organization for Evangelical

Christian psychologists.

(Ideally, to insure that this group

was comparable, only those names which appeared in both the

CAPS Directory and the National Register would have been included
in this subsample.

Hov^ever, due to the small number of CAPS

members, all doctoral level clinicians v^ose credentials were

those of the traditional mental health professional (e.g.,
Ph.D., Ed.D., M.D.) were included.

Materials

The Case Reports

Two case histories v^re needed for this study.
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Care
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was taken in choosing these cases
to insure

a)

that no bias

on the part of the experimenter
influenced their selection,
and

b)

that they were reasonably comparable
in the ratings

they would receive on the dependent
variable.

A three-step

procedure was followed in an effort to
achieve this aim.
All potential cases were chosen from the
records of the

Psychological Services Center of the University
of Massachusetts.
All initial psychotherapy summaries \^ich concerned
adults,

followed the standard format and did not exceed two
single
spaced pages in length were included for consideration
after

identifying data was removed or changed.
This unwieldy pool of 117 cases was reduced to a more

manageable group of finalists by having 12 graduate students
in clinical psychology each rate 10 cases on the clinical

judgment scale (CJS) used in the study, as well as indicate

how well written each case was on a 7-point scale.

All cases

v^ich were within 2/3 of a standard deviation of the mean
and rated as well written were included in the final pool.

At the third and final stage three advanced doctoral
students in clinical psychology rated the remaining 21 cases

on the CJS.

They achieved an overall reliability score of

.72 on three test cases before rating the final 21, and .65

on the final 21.

While this is not exceedingly high, it should

be noted that it was decided that the raters would not be
trained before making their ratings,

v»*iich

most likely contributed
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toward keeping the reliability
score low.

The reason for

this was that it was believed that
three clinicians each reflecting

their own notion of health and
sickness would better represent
the diverse population of psychologists
than raters trained

to respond in accordance with a particular
model.
The two final cases to be used in the
study were to be
those two
b)

a)

whose mean ratings on the CJS were closest,
and

who were reliably rated at the

.8

level or better by the

three raters.

The two cases chosen (see Appendix

A)

were Mr. S, a

28-year-old black male graduate student from the Virgin Islands

v^o reports a history of stammering, social anxiety and
perfectionistic tendencies, and Mr. W, a 27~year-old white

male college student who presents a history of unstable
relationships, depression and familial conflict.

The Experimental Manipulation
The ideological groups used

.

It was necessary to pick

four specific groups to represent the conservative religious,

conservative political, liberal religious and liberal political
conditions specified in the design.

Unfortunately, we were

able to think of no objective way to find four "equally extreme"
groups, since the designation of extremism usually reflects

the ideological position of the rater to some degree.
the task was left to the judgment of the experimenter.

Therefore,

The

,
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following choices were made:

conservative Religious

(CR)

:

(CP)

:

"Born Again" Fundamentalist

Christian;

Conservative Political

John Birch Society;

Liberal Religious

(LR)

:

Atheist International?

Liberal Political

(LP)

:

American Socialist Party.

The insertion of ideology into the
case history

.

The

reader will recall that each subject rated
one non-ideological

patient and one ideological patient.

Mention of the patient's

ideology was inserted at four points in
the case history.
In the first section, "identification of
the patient," two

sentences were added at the end:

"Further, the client makes

note of the fact that he is 'extremely conservative
religiously
(CR)

,

conservative politically

radical politically

(LP)

(organization name)."

.
'

(CP)

,

anti-religious

(LR)

Currently he is a member of

In the "presenting problems" section

the sentence was added, "At times Mr. S/W describes these

problems in the language of his ideological system, which

he says plays a central role in how he conceptualizes himself
and his world."

In the middle of

tlie

report in the last sentence

of "current life situation" the sentence "Mr. S/W also spends

a lot of his time in religious/political activities" was added.

To control for the perceived effect of mere involvement in
group activities the sentence, "Mr. S/W also participates
regularly in the events of several local community organizations"
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was placed in the corresponding
section of the non-ideological
patients' histories.

Finally, at the end of the report
in

the "diagnostic hypotheses" section,
the sentence was added

"Further assessment should reveal v^at
role, if any, Mr. S/W's

ideological beliefs play in his pathology
or adjustinent."

The Dependent Variables
The clinical judgment scale used in this study
(see Appendix
B)

was a modified form of that introduced by Wallach
and Strupp

(1966)

.

Though not used extensively, this scale had a more

'

comprehensive set of questions (21 items) than most.
Unfortunately, the tradition in this area of research has

been to write a new, usually very brief, scale for each study.

No standard well validated instrument has emerged.

Four dated

questions were dropped from the CJS and the response scales

were changed from 5 to

7 points,

and one open ended (diagnosis)
hypotheses

1

.

leaving 16 closed ended items
Again, it was predicted in

and 2 that ideological patients, particularly

those vho were conservative, religious, or both, would be

rated more negatively on this scale than non-ideological patients.

Demographic and Ideology Questionnaire
Subjects filled out a second questionnaire (see Appendix
C)

designed by the experimenter in v\^ich they indicated basic

demographic facts about themselves (e.g., sex, age, race,
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religion, family of origin religion,
geographic region now
residing, geographic region of origin,
social class of origin,

sexual orientation) as well as their
ideological position

with respect to psychology, politics
and religion.

To reduce

the possibility that examining this
questionnaire might alert

subjects to the purpose of the study and
thereby influence
their responses on the CJS, the demographic
questionnaire

was stapled shut and stamped with the message
"Please do not
open until case ratings are completed."

Of course, our third

set of hypotheses relate to the influence of these
factors

on subjects' CJS ratings.

Procedure

Instructions to Subjects
In the attached cover letter subjects were told how we

got their names, and asked for their participation in the
"psychotherapy research project at the University of

Massachusetts."

They were told that the purpose of the study

was to understand how "therapists respond to and evaluate
clinical material."

They were asked to rate both cases on

the CJS and then fill out the demographic questionnaire.

At the bottom, a brief handwritten note thanked them for their
participation.

Subjects were also told that they, of course, did not
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have to participate, their
responses would be confidential,
and that they indicated their
willingness to participate by
mailing back the questionnaire.
A brief summary of the results
could be obtained by mailing a
stamped self-addressed envelope.

What Was Done
Two thousand one hundred forty sets
of cover letters,
cases, questionnaires and business
reply envelopes were mailed

to prospective subjects.

An equal number of each case X ideology

combinations (10 in all) were randomly distributed
to the

prospective subjects.

.

CHAPTER

IV

RESULTS

The Sample

'Three

hundred sixty-three (18%) of the
potential respondents

returned usable data.

A summary of the distribution of demographic

and ideological characteristics of the
sample can be found
in Table 1.

Not surprisingly, the sample is composed
predominantly
of v^ite male heterosexuals (see Table
(40%)

1)

The largest number

.

originally hail from the Northeast, though with respect

to their current residence, they are evenly distributed
across

the nation's four regions.

Just over 50% come from a working

class background, with the next largest group (32%) coming

from an upper middle class family.

The median age is 45.

As a group, the sample is predominantly liberal in political
and religious orientation.

At least in matters of religion

there is a tendency to be less traditional than their parents.

Twenty-five percent claim no religion,

raised without it.

vy*iile

Forty-four percent were

25% Jewish, and 18% Catholic.

only 2% were

bom

Protestant,

The most popular psychological

orientation is psychoanalytic (39%) followed by behavioral
(25%)

and humanistic/existential (15%)
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TABLE

1

Demographic and Ideological Traits
of the .q^mplo

Variable

Sex

Male, 82%

Female, 18%

Age

30-45, 50%

45-80, 50%

Race

White, 96%

Black

Religion

Prot, 33%
None, 25%

Cath, 11%
Other, 9%

Jew, 22%

Family relig

Prot, 44%
None, 2%

Cath, 18%
Other, 6%

Jew, 25%

Geog location

Northeast, 24%
West, 28%

South, 26%

Midwest, 21%

iCdo L / T u ^

bouth, 1/%

Midwest, 28%

GeocT

oriain

iNv-'JL L-l

.

1

Rft

utner, 2%

West, 14%

Psych orien

Analytic, 39%
Other, 20%

Behav, 25%

Hurnan/exis, 15%

Pol it belief

Str lib, 14%
Str con, 2%

Mod lib, 50%
None, 3%

Mod con, 27%
Other, 4%

Ath, 9%

Ag, 22%
Mod trad, 17%

Str lib, 17%
Str trad, 6%

Upper mid, 32%

Relig belief

Mod lib, 24%

Class orig

Low, 7%
Upper, 10%

Working, 51%

Sexual pref

Hetero, 93%

Bi-homo, 6.5%

.
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Factor Analysis on the CJS

AS mentioned earlier, a 17-item Clinical
Judgment Scale
(CJS)

first introduced by Wallach and Strupp
(I960) was used

in this study as the dependent variable.

Factor analysis

employing an oblique rotation on the CJS revealed
that it

could be divided into four distinct factors.

Each item is

reported to be on the factor it loaded the most highly
with.

Factor 1
This factor, v^ich explains 54% of the variance, can

best be described as measuring the extent to v^ich the therapist
"likes the patient," and feels able to work with him effectively.
It contains items 14-17:
14)

Assuming that your recommendations for treatment

were followed, how would you rate the prognosis for this patient?
(Factor loading = .57)
15)

How would you rate your willingness to accept this

patient for treatment?
16)

Do you find it easy or difficult to empathize with

this patient?
17)

(Factor loading = .77).

(Factor loading = .84).

How would you characterize your personal reaction

to this patient?

(Factor loading = .77).

That this one factor explained the majority of the variance
is consistent with Wallach and Strupp' s (1966) finding that

..
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item 17 alone, personal
reaction to the patient, was
the best
predictor of the overall CJS
score.

Factor

2

This factor, explaining 25%
of the variance, can best

be described as nieasuring
clinicians' estimates of patient
"pathology" and corresponding need
for treatment,

it contains

items 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13:
8)

Considering the entire range of
mental disorder,

how would you characterize the degree
of disturbance in this
patient?
10)

(Factor loading = .33).
If this patient were accepted for
psychotherapy,

how would you rate the chances of his acting
out?

(Factor

loading = .47)
11)

How extensive a change in the patient's character

structure would you attempt?
12)

(Factor loading = .60).

Assuming the patient did not terminate prematurely,

about how long would you expect to see this patient?

(Factor

loading = .57)
13)

Assuming no treatment were undertaken, how would

you rate the prognosis for this patient?
=

(Factor loading

.55).

Factor

3

This factor, explaining 10% of the variance, appears

.
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to measure the amount of internal
and external "stress" the

clinician believes the patient is
experiencing,

it is composed

of items 1 and 2.

How much anxiety does this patient seem
to have?

1)

(Factor loading = .61).

How much environmental stress does this patient
have

2)

to contend with?

(Factor loading = .47).

Factor 4
This last factor, explaining 9% of the variance, seems
to measure the degree of "psychological maturity," positive

mental health or self-actualization the clinician believes
the patient has attained.

How much insight do you think this patient has into

3)

his problems?

(Factor loading = .47).

How would you rate this patient's overall emotional

5)

maturity?
6)

(Factor loading = .73).

How would you characterize this patient's social

adjustment?
7)

have?

(Factor loading = .48).

How much motivation for therapy does this patient

4)

have?

It contains items 3-7:

(Factor loading = .64).

How much "ego strength" does this patient seem to
(Factor loading = .48)
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Hypothesis

1

Hypothesis lA .

Patients described as holding an
extreme

ideological orientation will be
rated more negatively than

those v^o do not.
Using multivariate analysis of
variance for repeated

measures,! hypothesis lA was confirmed on
all four factors
(see Tables 2 and

3)

The ideological patients were rated

.

more negatively than the non-ideological
patients.

Sguared

Pearson correlations between the ideology/no ideology
condition
and the significant dependent variables reveal
that the ideology
factor explains only between 1% and 2% of the variance.

Hypothesis IB .

Ideological patients will be assigned

more severe diagnoses.

Specifically,

more axis II diagnoses and

b)

a)

they will receive

they will more often be diagnosed

obsessive compulsive or compulsive personality disorder.
The ideological groups were not more often assigned axis
II diagnoses.

However, using chi square, it was found that

the ideological patients were assigned the diagnosis of obsessive

compulsive disorder almost three

tiroes as often as the

non-ideological patients (see Figure

£

_<

.001)

.

1)

(7^2 = ig., df = 4,

In contrast, the non- ideological patients were

more often assigned the more mild generalized anxiety disorder

^Unless otherwise specified, all effects are tested by means
of multivariate analyses of variance for repeated measures,
and involve a main effect on interaction with "condition,"
the difference in the ratings assigned to ideological and
non-ideological patients.
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TABLE 2

Effect of Patient Ideology on
Factors 1-4

Multivariate

Factor

Like patient
Pathology

(1)

(2)

Stress

Maturity

3.23

4,

323

3.01

5,

315

<

.01

_<

.05

(3)

4.94

2,

336

<

.01

(4)

2.54

5,

323

<

.01

TABLE

3

Effect of Patient Ideology on Individual Items
Factor

Item

F

df

p

r^

1

Prognosis w trtmt

3.99

1,

326

<

.05

.01

1

Accept for trtmt

7.12

1.

326

<

.01

.01

1

Empathy for

12.17

1,

326

<

.001

.02

1

Personal react

6.24

1, 326

<

.01

.015

Length of trtmt

5.13

1,

319

<

.05

.005

3

Anxiety

4.94

1,

336

_<

.01

.01

4

Maturity

9.20

1,

327

<

.01

.015

4

Social adj

9.43

1,

327

<

.01

.015

2

.
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compared
Figure 1. Ideological and non-ideological patients
anxiety disorder
on percent of obsessive compulsive and generalized
diagnoses received.
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diagnosis,

it is worth noting that the
obsessive compulsive

diagnosis is very evenly distributed
ainong the four ideological
groups.

No significant differences were
found between the

groups in the diagnoses received.
It should be noted that this finding,
in particular,
is specific to Mr. S v^o, overall,
was diagnosed obsessive

compulsive 20% of the time.

only 2% of the time.

Mr.

W received that diagnosis

When analyzed separately, the difference

in diagnostic assignment is significant for
Mr. S (X.2 = 17.2,

df

= 4,

£

.01)

<

but not Mr. W.

Inasmuch as Mr. S evidences

some symptoms consistent with the obsessive
compulsive diagnosis,

but Mr. W does not, this is not surprising.

Hypothesis

2

Hypothesis 2A .

Subjects will rate conservative patients

more negatively than liberal patients.
Hypothesis 2A was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 2B

.

Religious patients will be rated more

negatively than political patients.
Hypothesis 2B was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 2C .

The conservative religious patients will

be rated more negatively than the other patients.
In fact, exactly the opposite was found.

Planned comparisons

revealed that subjects "liked" the conservative religious

.
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patient better than the other
three (see Figure 2)2 (nultivariate
F = 2.79, df = 4, 323,
p < .05)

These results were found

.

on all four of the items of the
"like the patient" factor:
"patient prognosis with treatment"

(F =

7.72, df = 1, 326,

£<

.01);

"desire to treat patient"

£

<

.01);

"empathy for patient"

<

.01); and "personal reaction to patient"

1,

326,

£

(£ = .08)

<

.01)

.

(F =

6.07, df = 1, 326,

(F = 7.35,

df = 1, 326,
(F = 6.76,

£

df =

Similar trends were noted on the "stress"

and "maturity" (£ = .12) factors.

These findings raise the question, "is the
conservative

religious patient, when analyzed alone, rated
more negatively
than the non-ideological patient?

in fact, he is not different

than the non-ideological patient on any of the four
factors.
Thus, the only dimension on vAiich the conservative
religious

patient differs from the non-ideological patient is diagnosis
(see Hypothesis IB section)

Hypothesis

3

Hypothesis 3A .

Liberal clinicians will rate conservative

patients more negatively than liberal patients.

Conservative

clinicians will do the opposite.
This hypothesis was confirmed (see Figures

3

and

4)

on

^In the interest of brevity, only the most significant item
of a significant factor will be graphed, with the exception
of hypothesis 3A, which was particularly complex. The dependent
variable depicted is always the difference in ratings assigned
the ideological and non- ideological patients.
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Figure 2. Therapists compared on empathy for conservative
religious patients vs. other ideological patients.

consv.
religious

consv.
political

libtral
religious

patient

patient

patient

liberal

political
patient
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Figure 3. Liberal and conservative therapists compared
on empathy for liberal and conservative patients.
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Figure 4. Liberal and conservative therapists compared
on personal reaction to liberal and conservative patients.

——
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.
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the "like the patient" factor when
the patients were combined
into conservative and liberal groups
(therapist ideology X

patient ideology X experimental condition
interaction3
(multivariate F = 4.31, df

= 4,

274, p < .01) and v*ien all

four patient ideological groups were analyzed
separately
(multivariate F

= 2.14,

df = 12, 273,

£

<

.05)

.

When the

patients were combined into two groups, significant
differences

were found on items measuring therapist "empathy for
patient"
(F = 8.74,

df = 1, 279, p

reaction" to the patient

<

and therapist's "personal

.005)

(F = 7.61,

df

= 1,

297, p < .01)

When the four patient ideological groups were analyzed separately,
significant differences were once again found on "empathy
for the patient"

(F = 7.76,

df

= 1,

"personal reaction" to the patient

£

<

297, p < .01) and therapist's
(F =

5.58, df = 1, 297,

.01)

A parallel finding on the "stress" scale barely missed
achieving significance

(p =

.06).

Figures 3 and 4 raise two important questions.

Both

are best answered by examining the results of this same 3-way

interaction v\hen the four ideological groups of patients were

analyzed separately (see Figures
1)

5

and

6)

Visually, it is undeniable that conservative therapists

rate liberal patients more negatively than conservative patients.

^All subsequent effects are 3-way interactions unless otherwise
specified.
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Figure 5. Liberal and conservative therapists compared
on empathy for CR, CP, LR and LP patients.

—

—

I

liberal
therapistt

conservative
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Figure 6. Liberal and conservative therapists
compared
on personal reaction to CR, CP, LR and LP
patients.
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Are liberals also biased?

On Figure

3,

they appear to rate

conservative groups more negatively than
liberal patients,

but is this difference significant?

On balance, the answer appears to be yes.

Newman-Keuls

post-hoc comparisons find that liberal therapists
do not rate
the conservative religious patient more
negatively than

conservative therapists do.

However, as we have already seen,

this ideological group of patients is unique with
respect

to the other three.

By and large, the sample as a v^ole is

not biased against the conservative religious patients.

By

contrast, in the case of the conservative political
patients,
liberal therapists rate them more negatively than conservative

therapists on both the "empathy" and "personal reaction" items.
2)

Do conservative clinicians claim to dislike liberal

patients more than liberal clinicians dislike conservative

patients?

Newman-Keuls comparisons were employed to answer

this question as well.

Figures

that case rather dramatically.

3

and 4 would seem to state

However, we must remember

that liberal therapists' ratings of the conservative religious

patient are averaged into the means depicted in those diagrams.
The fact that liberals also dislike the conservative political
patients less than conservative clinicians dislike both liberal
groups on the 'personal reaction" item (as well as to a

nonsignificant degree on the "empathy" item) is an even more

convincing confirmation of that hypothesis.

.

69

Thus, overall, we can conclude
that conservative therapists

express less tolerance for liberal
patients than liberal clinicians
express for conservative patients,
though both prefer patients
of their own persuasion.

An unexpected additional finding, overall
liberal clinicians
rate all ideological patients as experiencing
more stress

than do conservative clinicians (therapist
ideology X condition
interaction:

multivariate F = 6.21, df

= 2,

287, p < .01).

Findings were significant for both "patient
anxiety"

(F =

6.24, df = 1, 288, p < .05) and "environmental stress"
= 7.64,

df

= 1,

288,

Hypothesis 3B

.

£

<

(F

.01)

Religious liberals and atheists will

rate conservative groups more negatively than liberal groups.

Traditionally religious clinicians will do the opposite.
Findings for this hypothesis are very similar to those

found for political ideology.

The hypothesis was confirmed

for the "like the patient" factor (see Figure
F = 3.2, df = 4, 272, p

_<

.05).

.01)

p

.01)

<

(F =

and "personal reaction" item
.

(multivariate

Significance was found on

the "empathy for the patient" item

2<

7)

7.76, df = 1, 297,

(F = 5.58,

Further, if one examines Figure

7

df

=

1,

297,

and compares

it to Figure 3, the results for therapist religious ideology

are almost identical with those found for therapist political
ideology.
As one might expect, political and religious ideology

.
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Figure 7. Religiously liberal /non-religious and traditionally
religious therapists compared on empathy for liberal and conservative
patients
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are correlated

(r =

.33,

N

= 329,

p

<

.01)

.

When both are

included in a multiple regression
equation, the effect of

religious ideology almost completely
drops out, suggesting

that it is religious ideology's
association with political
ideology or some unknown third variable
v^ich explains its

effect on the dependent variable.

The political match or

mismatch between patient and therapist accounts
for 1.5% of
the variance on the "like the patient"
factor.

Hypothesis 3C.

Clinicians v^o hold extreme ideological

positions will rate patients with opposite beliefs
more negatively
than will moderates.

When therapists v^o were "strongly liberal" in
political
matters were compared to "moderate liberals" significant
differences were found in the predicted direction on the maturity
factor (see Figure

p

_<

.05).

Individual items measuring therapists' estimates

of "patient insight"

adjustment"
(F = 6.89,

(multivariate F = 2.69, df = 5, 92,

8)

(F = 3.93,

(F = 4.58,

df = 1, 196, p

<

.05), "social

df = 1, 196, p < .01), and "ego strength"

df = 1, 196, p < .01) were significant.

A parallel finding on the maturity scale barely missed
significance

(p =

.052) when therapists were divided into

religious liberals vs. atheists and agnostics.

Trends were

found on the "like the patient" scale for both political
=

.08)

and religious ideology (£

=

(p

.12).

Unfortunately, there were so few extreme conservatives
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Figure 8. Extreme and moderate liberal therapists
compared
on estimates of patient ego strength for liberal
and conservative
patients
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in the sample that extreme
and moderate conservatives
could
not be compared.

Hypothesis 3D
,

Clinicians from the Northeast, and
possibly

the West Coast, will react

nx^re

negatively to conservative

patients than will the rest of
the country.

When Northeasterners were compared
to the rest of the
country (including the West Coast)

the hypothesis was supported

,

on the "maturity" factor (see Figure
2.45, df = 5, 317,

£

<

.05)

9)

(multivariate F =

The only significant item was

.

therapists' estimate of how much insight
the patient had (F
4.22, df = 1, 321,

£

<

.05)

,

with trends on motivation for

therapy and social adjustment.
It is unlikely that this effect is an artifact
of political

orientation.

Geographic location and political orientation

do show a small correlation (.14).

However, v*ien both are

introduced into a hierarchical multiple regression equation,

geographic location explains the most variance

(2%)

on the

"maturity" factor.

Moreover, this effect appears to also be independent

of the strong vs. moderate liberal effect.

Strong liberals,

who were found to differ from moderate liberals on this factor,
are not more likely to live in the Northeast.
Finally, one need not be concerned that the geography

finding may be an artifact of the fact that CAPS therapists,
viho

tend to be conservative, live predominantly outside of
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Figure 9. Northeastern and other therapists conpared on
estimates of patient insight for liberal and conservative patients.
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the Northeast (see pg.

83)

.

When the CAPS therapists are

removed from the analysis, the same
results are obtained
(multivariate F = 2.55, df

Hypothesis 3E.

= 5,

281, p < .05).

Jews will rate conservative patients

more negatively and liberal patients
more positively than
Gentiles,

in particular, Jews and Gentiles may
appear different

on the conservative religious patient.
This hypothesis was not confirmed.

Unexpectedly, Jews

were found to react less adversely overall to the
ideological
groups than Gentiles on the "like the patient" factor
(therapist

religion X condition interaction:

df = 4, 288, £

<

.01)

.

multivariate F = 3.44,

None of the individual items achieved

significance, though "personal reaction" almost did

A similar trend v^ich barely missed significance

(p =

(p =

.055).

.056)

was found on the "maturity" factor.
Hypothesis 3F .

Psychoanalysts will react more negatively

to the ideological patients than will behaviorists
Hypothesis 3F was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 3G .

Women will react more favorably to the

conservative religious patients than men.
Hypothesis 3G was not confirmed.
Hypothesis 3H

.

Homosexual clinicians will react more

negatively to conservative patients and more positively to
liberal patients than will heterosexual clinicians.

On the "stress" factor a trend in the predicted direction
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was found

(p =

.079).

i^e "patient anxiety" ite.
was significant

(F = 5.09,

df = 1, 326,
p = .02) and the "environmental stress"
item was not significant.
The two-way therapist sexual
preference
X patient ideology interaction,
however, was significant
(r^ltivariate F

= 3.38,

df = 2, 325, p < .05)

(see Figure

10).

Exploratory Questions

No relationship was found between
the age or social class
of origin of the clinicians and
their responses.

There were

too few minorities in the sample
to assess the impact of race.

Mr. S Compared to Mr.

W

The effort to find two perfectly matched cases
was less

than completely successful.

Overall,

^4r.

S, the

black graduate

student presenting problems of stuttering, social anxiety

and perfectionism, was seen more positively than was the v*iite

college student presenting unstable relationships, depression
and familial conflict

(F =

12.2, df = 4, 673,

£

<

.001).

Hotelling's T^ reveals that Mr. S scores more positively on
the "like the patient" factor

and the "pathology" factor

(F = 12,

(F = 47.9,

df

= 4,

673,

£

df = 5, 663, p

<

<

.001)

.001).

However, Mr. S is seen as experiencing significantly more
internal and external stress

(F = 56,

df

= 2,

689,

£

_<

.001).
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Figure 10. Hcxnosexual /bisexual and heterosexual therapists
compared on estimates of patient anxiety for liberal and conservative
patients
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on the "naturity" factor,
Mr. s and Mr. w split,
with Mr. s
being seen as less insightful
(t = 3.71,

df = 676, p

and having a less satisfactory
social adjustinent

df

= 676,

= 6.81,

£

<

.01)

,

(t =

2

<

.001)

2.54,

v^iie Mr. W is seen as less
mature

df = 676, p < .001) and
lower in ego strength

6.96, df = 676,

<

(t
(t =

.001).

Ihe discovery of these differences
between the two case

histories raises at least three
potential problems relevant
to other analyses:
1)

If Mr. S and Mr.

W are not evenly distributed among

the ideological and nonideological
cases, results could be

an artifact of the Mr. S/Mr. W
distribution.
this is not a problem.
(e.g.

Mr. S and Mr.

Fortunately,

W are very evenly distributed

51% of the ideological cases are Mr. S and
49% Mr. W)

,

2)

The differences between Mr. S and Mr. W
will increase

the error term making it more difficult to
achieve significance

and lowering the percentage of variance accounted
for by the
experimental manipulation,

in fact, the effect sizes in this

study are small, and this may be one contributing factor.
3)

If Mr. S and Mr.

W are different,

it may be that

the experimental manipulation does not influence the ratings

given to both of them.

When analyzed alone, the ideological

patients are rated significantly more negatively than the
nonideological patient for Mr. S
_<

.05)

but not for Mr. W.

(F = 1.9,

df

=

16,

306,

£

However, though they fail to achieve
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Significance, each of the
16 items is in the expected
direction
and item 5, patient maturity,
is significant (t =
2.91, df
= 333,

p

<

.01)

.

Therefore, though it is clear
that the effect

is stronger for one
patient, the fact that both
consistently

achieve results in the same
direction seems an adequate basis
for combining them in
subsequent analyses, though caution
will need to be applied when
discussing the genera lizability
of these findings.

CAPS and Na tional Register Therapists
Compared

Before combining the CAPS and National
Register samples,

they were compared for possible differences.

As one might

expect, Chi square reveals that CAPS
therapists are much more

likely to be Protestant

(

a Protestant background 1:^2
traditional

= 112,

conservative

(;*^2

= 53^

df
^f

= 53,

df

= 4,

p < .0001)

= 48,

df

= 4,

p

= 6,

£

= 6,

<

p

.0001)

,

from

.0001), religiously

and politically

CAPS clinicians

.0001).

<

<

,

were also more likely to live in the West or Midwest and
less
likely to live in the Northeast than National Register

psychologists

(;t.2

= 10.9,

df

= 4,

p

<

.05)

.

likely to originate from the Northeast as well

df =

1,

£

<

They were less
(;t.2

= 4,3,

.05)

When the four ideological patients are combined into
two groups, conservative patients and liberal patients, CAPS
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therapists were found to rate
conservative patients lower
on the stress factor than
National Register therapists
(see

Figure 11)

(professional organization X
patient ideology X

condition interaction:

£

<

.05)

multivariate F = 3.88, df =
2, 342,

This difference is almost
exclusively explained

.

by the difference between
CAPS and National Register therapists
on the "environmental stress"
item (F = 7.27, df = 1, 343,

£

<

.01)

Surprisingly, the CAPS clinicians
rated all of the ideological

groups lower than the National Register
sample on the "maturityfactor (professional organization
X condition interaction:

multivariate F

= 4.08,

df = 5, 329,

p

<

.01)

item on this factor was "patient maturity"
= 1,

333,

£

<

.

(F =

The only significant
12.85, df

.001)

No differences were found on the other factors or
the
diagnoses assigned to patients.

85

Figure 11. National Register and CAPS therapists compared
on estimates of patient environmental stress for liberal and
conservative patients.
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CHAPTER

V

DISCUSSION

Overview

Overall, strong support has
been found for the notion

that patients holding an
extreme ideological orientation
are

perceived more negatively by
clinicians than non-ideological
patients.

Contrary to predictions, the
conservative religious

patient was the exception rather
than the preeminent example
of this effect.

Finally, a number of demographic
and ideological

factors, including therapists'
political and religious ideology,

geographic location and sexual orientation
were found to interact

with therapists' evaluations of ideological
patients in both
predicted and unexpected ways.

Extreme Ideolog ical Orientations and Clinical
Judgment

The extreme ideological patients were seen as more
disturbed,
immature, under greater stress, and were less liked than
the

non-ideological patients.

They were also more likely to be

diagnosed obsessive-compul sive
Are these findings evidence of prejudice?

This is a

complex question about v^ich arguments could be made for either
side.
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If one wanted to argue
the

affirmtive position, he or

she would simply need to
point to this study's findings.

When all other factors are held
constant, clinicians rate
a patient with an extreme
ideological orientation more negatively
than a non-ideological patient
on
all four factors.

On the

face of it this seems to be a
clear indication of bias.

Yet,

in fairness, a number of mitigating
factors need be considered.
First, to put this finding in
perspective, it should

be noted that the effect size was
quite small, explaining
no more than 2% of the variance.

This suggests that v^ile

the patient's ideological orientation
influenced clinicians'
judgments, it was a relatively small influence.

This is a

strong contrast to unabashedly negative ratings
college students

give to these same groups (Gartner, in progress)

.

Psychologists

indeed may distinguish themselves more by their tolerance

than their prejudice.
Furthermore, these results were strongest for one patient,
Mr. S, a black graduate student who manifested a number of

compulsive symptoms.

Further research may show that particular

patient demographics and traits are more likely to elicit

a negative response to patient ideology, rather than it being
a simple "across the board bias."

Further research is needed

to determine how general izable these findings are.

(It is

a matter of speculation as to vihat in Mr. S elicited a stronger
response.

His race may make an extreme ideological position
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appear

^re

unusual, or his expulsive
symptc^s

rray

be nK.re

consistent with clinicians'
negative expectations concerning
the psychological function
of extrene ideological
systems.)
Secondly, there is a
rational basis for niaking
negative
judgments about these groups.
Sone research has found that
people with extreme right
wing and extreme left wing views
are less well adjusted than
the general population (Eysenck
& coulter,

1972; Kreml, 1977; Rokeach,
1960).

in particular,

research has found such individuals
to be more dogmatic.

Though there is not room for a
full review here, dogmatism

has been correlated with just about
everything under the sun
over the last twenty years, from
cognitive rigidity (Rokeach,
to paranoia (Eysenck & Coulter,
1972)

1960)

,

and the consensus

is that it is better not to be
dogmatic.

The critic pressing for the prejudice
theory would, of
course, seek to rebut these arguments.

that a "small bias" is still a bias,

He or she would argue
(in addition, we don't

really know how small the bias is since psychologists
may
be trying to appear nonprejudiced.

)

Further, the existence

of a rational or statistical basis for bias does not
necessarily

justify it.

For example, it is well known that women as a

group have been found to perform more poorly than men on
mathematical tests.
tests.)

(Conversely, men are worse on verbal

Would it be fair or reasonable for science oriented

graduate schools to rank female applicants lower than males
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on the basis of these statistical
norms?

Finally,

it is

relevant to note that the strength
of the relationships between
group inembership and most negative
traits is rarely as strong
as people perceive them to be
(Hamilton, 1981)

.

Patients

with extreme ideological orientations
may not be as sick as
clinicians think.

The proponents of these two views could
probably continue
their debate.

However, we can end this section with a
conclusion

they would both most likely agree on.

Whether or not a negative

preliminary evaluation of an ideological patient
is an expression
of prejudice, it certainly does not bode well
for the future
therapeutic relationship.
In an important study, Hans Strupp (1958) showed
therapists

a film of a clinical interview.

At key moments the film was

stopped and the subject played the role of therapist.

found that:
Therapists who indicated a dislike for
the patient tended to choose more pejorative
diagnostic labels, such as psychopath,
paranoid or character disorder. They
also saw the patient as less insightful,
more immature, and having a poor prognosis.
They anticipated encountering certain
kinds of problems in treatment, such as
counter transference feelings of anger
or resentment. These therapists were
more inclined to be strict, active and
to suggest a briefer and more supportive
type of therapy which might iDe terminated
by unworkable countertransference reactions.
Their interventions were rated as colder
emd less empathic [three times as often] ....
[This study] clearly demonstrates that
a clinician's initial impressions and

Strupp
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feelings about a patient can strongly
and adversely affect his clinical
work.
(Singer & Luborsky, 1977,
pg. 442-443)
Past research (Berzins, 1977; Beutler,
1972) has demonstrated

that a high degree of value discrepancy
between patient and

therapist is a poor prognostic indicator
for therapy.

The

current findings suggest that the therapist's
initial negative
reaction to patients

v*io

differ from them ideologically may

be an important factor in that effect.
The encouraging finding is that Strupp
(1958) reports

that therapists who had themselves been analyzed
were less
likely to be cold to patients they did not like,
the implication

being that therapists who are more advanced, introspective
or conflict-free can overcome their personal reactions well

enough to provide quality services to the disliked patient.
If nothing else, the current study should alert us as clinicians

to the potential problem of ideological countertransf erence

and allow us to take appropriate steps to minimize its negative
impact on our clinical work.

Religious Prejudice in Psychology?

This study has not provided great support for the notion

that psychologists' clinical judgments are biased against
conservative religious patients.

The Christian fundamentalist

patient was not rated more negatively than the non- ideological

92

patient on any of the four factors.

These results are consistent

with those reported by I^wis
(1983) v^o, in a similar study,
found no bias against a depressed
evangelical who used religious
language during an interview.

In addition, the conservative

religious patient in this study was
rated more positively
than the other three ideological
groups.
It is unfortunate that there is no
empirical research

on this problem before 1983.
I

Though it is pure speculation,

suspect the same results might not have been
obtained twenty

or thirty years ago.

Rather, this greater tolerance toward

religion may be a more recent development, the product
of
at least three separate developments.
First, over the last twenty years, the field has become

increasingly sensitive to biases of all kinds among mental

health professionals (Abranowitz

&

Dokecki, 1974). Secondly,

there seems to have been a change specifically in the attitudes

of mental health professionals toward religion.

While early

psychologists and psychiatrists expressed their negative views
toward religion with little apology or opposition (see Gartner,
1982)

,

a more recent trend toward a rapprochement between

psychology and religion has been noted by several authors
(Bergin, 1983; Pattison, 1969; Saffady, 1976). Parallel to

this change in psychologists' attitudes toward religion has

been a change in the character and general public perception
of conservative religious groups.

Fundamentalists, with some
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justification, were often perceived
as reactionary, rigid,

anti -intellectual, legalistic, and
separatistic

.

However,

more recently, a new group, whom
Quebedeaux (1974) has called
the "Young Evangelicals," has emerged.

They are theologically

conservative, but as a group more educated,
moderate and mainstream
in their beliefs and lifestyles.

The prime example is former

president Jimmy Carter, who probably did the most
to alert
the American public that not all Evangelicals
fit the old

Fundamentalist stereotype.
Thus, a greater tolerance for religion as well as a
greater

sophistication about the general problems of bias and the

diversity of religious people may have contributed to these
findings.

Psychologists may choose to understand their individual

patient's religious faith in greater depth before pre- judging
it.

These results should be encouraging to those religious

people

v*io

fear entering psychotherapy because they believe

therapists are hostile to religion (King, 1978)
This is not to suggest that a conservative religious

orientation has no influence on clinicians' perceptions of
clients. It was found that the conservative religious patient

was more likely to be given the diagnosis of obsessive compulsive,
in contrast to the non-ideological patient

v*io

to be diagnosed generalized anxiety disorder.

was more likely
Obsessive compulsive

disorder is generally considered to be both more severe and
unusual than generalized anxiety disorder (American Psychiatric
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Association, 1980).

Thus, it is difficult to explain v^y

the conservative religious patient
was not rated more negatively

on the Clinical Judgment Scale,

it is possible that subjects

inflated their ratings of the conservative
religious patient
in an effort not to appear prejudiced (who
could better decipher

the purpose of a psychological experiment than
a psychologist?)
It is also possible that the patient's religion may
influence

therapists' clinical judgments in a fashion vAiich is more

qualitative than quantitative.

Rather than causing them to

see the patient as more disturbed, it changes the way in v^ich

they understand his disturbance.

Freud (1913) argued 70 years

ago that religion is an obsessive conpulsive neurosis.
appear to still be influenced by that view today.

Clinicians

(It should,

however, also be noted that effect was almost exclusively

specific to one patient

vi^o

manifested some symptoms consistent

with the obsessive compulsive diagnosis.

Thus, the mere religious

label alone is not sufficient to elicit the obsessive compulsive

diagnosis.)

More research into qualitative differences in

how clinicians conceptualize cases involving religious patients
seems called for.
The next question is v^y were the other three ideological

groups perceived so much more negatively than the conservative
religious patient?

While there may be more than one possible

explanation, the most plausible appears to be that the conservative

religious group is substantially more frequent in the American
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population.

One in three Americans claims to be a
Born-Again

Christian (Princeton Religious Research,
1982) whereas the
number of John Birch Society, Atheist
International and Socialist

party members is likely to be no more than 1%
of the population.
This probably represents an error in the
experimental design,

though perhaps a serendipitous one.

An effort was made to

balance the groups, at least subjectively, with respect to
extremism, but no attention was paid to statistical frequency.
Thus, ideological belief systems v^ich are both extreme

and rare may be the most likely to be perceived as deviant

by clinicians.

In fact, one of the most commonly taught models

of psychological deviance is the statistical model (Kleinmuntz,
1980)

,

v^ich states the simple thesis that the unusual is

deviant.

Little research has been done on the extent to which

the statistical model actually affects clinicians' day-to-day

clinical judgments.
Overall, these results suggest that the question of religious

prejudice in psychology is a complex one.

The appropriate

question may not be "does religious bias exist?" but among
vy*iich

psychologists, against which groups, under v^ich

circumstances?

For instance, Gartner (1982) found that professors

of clinical psychology were less likely to admit a Born-Again
Christian into clinical psychology graduate school than an
identical non-ideological applicant.

It may be that clinicians

are less tolerant of ideological diversity among potential
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colleagues than among patients.

The statistical model of

deviance may help explain this finding
as well.

While one

out of five Americans, and therefore
we can assume a substantial
number of patients, are traditionally
religious (Princeton
Religious Research Center, 1982)
is religiously traditional

,

only one in 25 psychologists

(Nix, 1978; this study).

Thus,

religious therapists are statistically deviant
while religious

patients are not.

Further research into this "professional

bias" is planned by this author.

In addition, there is as

of now little psychotherapy process research that examines
the religious variable.

Indeed, it may be some time before

we have a complete picture of clinicians' attitudes toward
religion.

The Effect of Therapists' Demographic and Ideological Traits

Political Ideology

Both liberal and conservative clinicians were found to
like patients better v^ose ideologies were closer to their
own.

Conservative therapists disliked liberal patients more

than conservative patients and liberal clinicians disliked

conservative patients (not including the conservative religious
patient) more than liberal patients.

Further, this effect

appears stronger the more extreme the therapist's ideology
is, and therefore, the larger the ideological gulf between
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therapist and patient.
Past research (Ehrlich, 1973) has shown
that most people
like people who are ideologically
consistent with themselves

better than other people

v*io

are not.

In this sense, clinicians

are perhaps only demonstrating that they are
human,

it is

an important and happy finding that clinicians did
not change

their judgments of patient pathology or maturity on the
basis

of the ideological match between themselves and the patient,

though the effect on the stress factor failed to achieve
significance by only a narrow nergin.

Probably the most important conclusion we can draw from
these results is that many therapists should carefully consider

before seeing patients whose ideologies are sharply different

from their own.

At the very least, clinicians should be sensitive

to the potential problem of ideological countertransf erence
This may be particularly important for therapists

hold extreme beliefs.

viho

themselves

As was mentioned earlier, these findings

illuminate one key factor that may contribute to the lower
success rate therapists have with patients v^ose values differ

strongly from their own (Berzins, 1977; Beutler, 1972).

Therapists

may begin liking such patients less from the beginning, making
the formation of an effective therapeutic alliance difficult.
Overall, conservative clinicians dislike liberal patients

more than liberal clinicians dislike conservative patients.
The most ready explanation is simply that conservatives may
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be more prejudiced than liberals, which
is consistent with
past research (Simpson & Yinger, 1972)

.

However, this finding

may be best understood in the context of another
one:

liberals

see all ideological groups as being higher in
stress than

do conservative therapists.

These two findings may reflect

differences at the heart of liberal and conservative ideology.
In some ways it could be said that liberals believe more
in a process than a creed v^en compared to conservatives.

Stated simplistically, liberals seem to believe more in the
importance of letting the human mind and spirit develop unimpeded,
in the faith that that process will lead to knowledge and

human growth.

For that reason, the American Civil Literties

Union is more concerned with preserving political freedom
(even for Nazis) than in proposing a particular political

platform, and some liberal psychologists are as concerned

about whether a patient's mind is open and flexible as they
are about its contents.

In contrast, conservatives may be

more concerned with the preservation of a particular set of
ideas, essential truths (e.g., the central ity of the family),

v^ich are not necessarily viewed as appropriate subjects for
debate.
If the above analysis is correct, it is not surprising

that liberals overall view extreme ideological orientations

more negatively than conservatives.

Such orientations limit

the experimentation and curiosity v^ich the liberal cherishes
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by demanding adherence to a particular
viewpoint.

The extreme

ideologue may be seen as experiencing
more stress either because

his or her orientation is seen as a
"cheap" solution to the

ambiguity of life and intolerable personal
stress, or because
the orientation itself is seen as restrictive
and therefore

stress inducing.
In contrast, the conservative appears to be more
offended

by ideas v^ich differ from his or hers in content, v^ich
would
be consistent with the conservative's concern for a particular
set of beliefs.

Religious Ideology
Findings for this variable were virtually identical to
those obtained for political ideology.

Indeed, political

and religious ideology were correlated and explained the same
portion of variance.

Political ideology appeared to explain

slightly more variance, causing it to nudge religious ideology

out of the multiple regression equation.

While political

ideology seems a bit more salient, it appears that there may
be an overall liberal /conservative continuum, on v^ich therapists

can be divided, which incorporates both political and religious
ideology.

If that were the case, we would expect to find

parallel results for both variables as we have indeed found.
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Geography
Northeastern clinicians perceive extreme
conservative
patients to be more immature than extreme
liberal patients,

v^ereas this is not true of therapists who
live in other regions.
The statistical model of deviance may again be
of use
here.

Extreme conservatives are more infrequent in the
Northeast.

For example, the Princeton Religious Research Center
(1982)

found almost every other Southerner to be an Evangelical
Christian,

but only one in 11 Northeastemers were found to hold such
beliefs.

Thus, the statistical model would predict that

Northeastern clinicians would rate extreme conservative groups
more negatively.

(Inasmuch as Northeastern conservatives

have chosen a belief system vdiich is more unusual to their
region, it is at least conceivable that research may find

them to be more disturbed than conservatives in the rest of
the country.)

These findings suggest that the anti-conservative

discrimination which this author expected to find in this

data may be peculiar to the Northeast.

(Not coincidental ly,

many of the observations v^iich led the author to hypothesize
such a bias exists were based on the author's experience as

a Northeastern doctoral student in clinical psychology.)

Northeastern clinicians may need to take special care in attending
to the problem of anti-conservatism.
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CAPS Members
CAPS members perceive conservative
patients as experiencing
less stress than liberal
patients.

iTiis

may be indicative

of a general bias in favor of
the conservative patients, which
is consistent with findings
concerning religious ideology

reported earlier (indeed, CAPS members
show results in the

appropriate direction on the "like the
patient" factor)

Two qualifying observations are worth noting,
however.
First, CAPS members do not rate liberal
patients as experiencing

more stress than do therapists from the
National Register.
They are expressing a positive bias in favor
of the conservative
patients, but not a corresponding negative one
toward the
liberals.

Secondly, this effect is almost completely specific

to the item measuring environmental stress, which is
very
unusual.
analyses.

That particular item was rarely significant in other

Though it is only a speculation, one wonders if

these traditionally religious therapists, familiar with the

close-knit communities that grow up around churches, are inferring
that patients who belong to such traditional organizations

have a stronger than average support system.
CAPS members also rated all the ideological groups as

more immature than did the rest of the sample.

There may

be a hint here, as in the findings for therapist religious
ideology, of the link between religiosity and prejudice (Simpson
& Yinger, 1972) vAiich has

been reported in the general population.
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It may also be that CAPS
therapists, by virtue of their own

ideological commitinent, are more
sensitive to subtle variations
in extreme ideological orientations.

(Indeed, many of the

articles published in the journals
v^ich publish articles
of concern to CAPS members focus on
distinguishing between

"mture" and "immature" faith.)

For instance, most CAPS therapists

would most likely notice that the conservative
religious patient
was described as a "Fundamentalist."

Within Christian circles,

the label "Fundamentalist" is often sharply
contrasted to
the less reactionary "Evangelical" (Quebedeaux,
1974)

,

v^iereas

many outsiders might not know the difference.
More generally, these results may be another example

of therapists who themselves hold an extreme ideological
orientation, being more reactive than moderate therapists

to the ideological belief system of their patients.

Such

therapists would be well advised to devote special attention
to their potentially negative reactions toward patients whose
ideologies differ from their own.

Sexual Orientation
Hantiosexual and bisexual

clinicians perceive conservative

patients as experiencing more stress, particularly anxiety,
than liberal patients, and perceive conservative patients
as experiencing more stress than heterosexual clinicians do.

Conservative groups have long held negative (some would
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argue persecutory) attitudes
toward homosexuality and homosexuals.
It is, thus, not surprising to
find that homosexual clinicians

perceive conservative patients negatively.

One wonders if

the homosexual clinicians are
projecting some of their own

feelings about conservative groups onto
their patients.
The conservative patient may make the
homosexual clinician
anxious, or, putting himself in the patient's
place, the homosexual

clinician may imagine that if he or she were a
conservative,

or lived in a conservative subculture, it would
be very personally
stressful
In any case, the same note of caution that has been
sounded

to other groups concerning the danger of ideological

countertransference should be extended to homosexual clinicians
vjho

may have extreme conservative patients.

Religion
Jews were found to be more tolerant than Gentiles of
ideological groups, an intriguing finding.

Jews may be more

sensitive to intolerance, as a consequence of being victimized

by it.

However, inasmuch as those victimizers were often

fueled by extreme ideologies, Jews' greater tolerance of such
people is surprising.

These results are at variance with

previous findings (Gartner, 1982) v^ich showed Jews to react

more negatively than Gentiles to a Born-Again Christian applicant
to graduate school in clinical psychology.

Clearly, more

research into this variable is called
for.
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IMTAKE SUMMARY
Mr. S is a 28-year-old
black b^Ii.
n.
P"""tly toileting a Masters
degree in Conputer Science.
Mr S w^n^ !
the Virgin I.lands to
^'^^l"**' ""e fron.
attend g^.d^itf icL^i'"?'
With three other «le
apartment
.tudentf

"

"

"

Preaenting Probleas
his .Mlity'"';ea'^*ii^h
'""'^^y
o'tie'r iTrJ"'
'"''"^
.oxious anJ he ."«e s or
^^tCr
He I?
«d precise, and to do thxngs Jast
'°
illV'^Vll"^'''''
""'^'^
idle." worries about .-all
fhin« and if
J'^*

^.V"'

-th

^"""^1

Mental Status
Mr

and logical.

History of Referring Situation

""'^
""P"^'
.peec^theri;; "ihe^refe'r^nnS''''^"
*
indirectly suggested
the possibility of anxiety
^''^ ''-"^''^^^^y
psycLther^py a^ an

olivine .
K
liruicf
adjunct Jo"
to speech
:e h therapy.
llllir'

°^ stammering or stuttering since early childhood,
*
and of
o?''.lL!!^^''?!
always talking very fast when "excited."
He has always experienced som^
distress approaching people verbally because
the subtle reaction^^to his
co.»unicative style have been perceived by hias negative (i e ' ficiil
expressions of puzzle-ent or i-patience).

Fa-ily Background
^'
i8"'^*<»
the Virgin Islands to the United States two
years ago. His father, who was a co-q»ercial
artist, now works as a cook in a
restaurant
His -other, A4, previously a housewife, now works
as a -aid in
a nursing hoae.
Mr. S perceives the fa-ily' s change in status as
humiliating
and some relatives allegedly "rub it in." However,
the family has been able to
anage well enough to defray the cost of .chool support for
the two sons, of
whom the client is the oldest. The younger brother
is finishing a college degree
inis year. This younger brother is reported to be
an achiever and doing well
but some early stuttering is reported for him as well.

Continued on Back
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PiychoBOciil History

"ports an unreiurkable developnental history, except for
the occasional
stuttering since the age of 6 years. He attended an
all-Lie school f "J
preschool to last year of high school. His perforwnce was
"average" because
he was too fond of playing; for which he was occasionally
punished if school
work was neglected. At around the age of 12 years he reportedly
began gettinB
serious about school, but does not recall any pressure to do
so from external
sources.
He attended college at an all-aale school in the Virgin
Islands,
after which he migrated to the United States to pursue a graduate
degree.' A
year before graduating his faaily emigrated to the United States.

Ud
-iA

J

Mr. S has had a closer relationship with his mother than with
his father.
The other is described as very strict, quite frank, soaietiBes forceful,
quite
capable, and as a very nice person. The relationship with the father
has been
distant, although the client is certain of his father's affection. The
father
is described as somewhat iaipersonal, not openly affectionate and
indifferent to
eaotional stimuli.
Mr. S has had limited personal contact with females, mainly some early
interaction with cousins. He attributes this to cultural restrictions, but
acknowledges being somewhat shy towards women. He has never dated anyone.
He has not allowed himself to "get close" to any female, because of cultural
restrictions and because he thinks they would not be interested in him anyway.
Mr. S has several male acquaintances with whom he partakes of some entertainment,
such as the movies and sports.

Current Life Situation
Mr. S has completed the requirements for the Masters degree.
He is presently
taking some courses and applying for employment. Major sources of stress are
the invariably negative responses he has to the considerably large number of
applications he submits. However, he is confident something will turn up.
Presently, he receives research assistantship stipends, which appear to be
well managed. He acknowledges that he could receive financial assistance
from his parents, if needed. Mr. S also participates regularly in the events
of several local comnunity organizations.

Motivation
Mr. S would like to speak more slowly and to be less apprehensive about
talking.
He appears to be interested in finding out why people react negatively
to his verbal approach in order to improve his chances with his interpersonal
relationships

Diagnostic Hypothesis
Mr. S appears very sensitive to rejection, and to use a polarized
structuredness and rationalization as a means to avoid rejections. It is
obvious he is fairly distant from his feelings and that basically be may be
Given the long history of stuttering and anxiety
an insecure individual.
related to interpersonal interactions, it is possible he may have rationalized
that a speech deficit is the cause of bis deficient relationships.
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INTAKE SUMMARY

Identif iciti on of patient: Mr W ia • 97 v..- ^-ia ^o. »
,
an o rg.n.zer for a pubiL .nte res^^gr^u"
'Hrbn'ItJi^drS^ :vrr ! ^ ur.^^^
has^not received a degree. He is fros. a
.iddle class fa.ily. He curr^???*
liJ^s

frggenting syptoBs or syndromP:
The client stated that feelings of oanir
.
and insecurity have begun to overcome him. and
that problems fromh s JajJ Tre
beginning to "catch up" with him. He also described
having dif f icultieriiJ^a

"

'''^'^^^ S'*^ "complicated." and that he
wants to be able to resist: this urge in the future
and stabilize his life.

Mental status
The client dresses rather casually, often in
clothes from
•econd-hand stores, but is always neat in his appearance.
There were no
Indications of thought disorder or severe psychopathology
and the client seemed
to be highly intelligent and insightful.
:

,

History of Referring Situation: The client reports that
he has been "happy,
go-lucky most of his life, but feels that his past is now
"catching up" with him
He has not had any previous therapy.

Family Background: W's grandfather was a wealthy businessman,
and his
family had a middle-class life. Although Mr. W describes his
stepfather as
"paranoid," and his mother as "depressed and alcoholic" neither were
ever
hospitalized for psychiatric disorder. His brother is a highly successful
administrator and businessman.
Psychologi cal History
Mr. W's father died when the client was 3 years old.
and one of his earliest memories is of the plane flight to his father's
funeral.'
He lived with his mother and grandparents until the age of 5, when his mother
remarried. Mr. W describes his stepfather as an extremely rigid, paranoid man
who made life miserable for the family. He speaks with bitterness of this man
who he feels caused most of his current anxieties and self-doubt. He was
frequently punished by this step-father for minor offenses in a way he felt
was arbitrary and overly severe. Mr. W describes his relationship with his
mother as becoming more distant, since his step-father interpreted affection
from the mother to the children as indications of "disloyalty."
:

As an adolescent, Mr. W was an outstanding high school soccer player "but
was rebellious and uninterested about academics." His brother was labeled by
the family as the "smart one," and Mr. W as the "athletic one."
Mr. W's days in college were marked by frequent incidents of dropping out
of school, moving, and beginning at other schools. He met the woman who became
his wife while at school.
His wife began having affairs with other men,
however, and they were divorced after five years of marriage. They have been
apart for about ten years. His wife had a son who Mr. W is convinced was
fathered by another man.

Continued on Back —

Since the Mrital breakup, Mr. W has lived with or been in an
intensive
relationship with a series of woMn. aaintaining onogany with each for
a period
of tiae.
Past Medical History: Mr. W reported feeling a good deal of auscle
aches
and other psychosomatic signs in the aonths before beginning therapy. He
has
been in good health for aost of his life.

Current Life Situation
Mr. W has been involved in a struggle about whether
to continue his relationship or go on to another woaan. He is working as an
organizer for a local public interest group, and he currently lives alone. He
is friendly with the people he works with, but prefers to spend tisie with his
current love object or by himself. He enjoys running, and other outdoor
activities. Mr. W also participates regularly in the events of several local
coBBunity organizations.
:

Financial Status

:

He has a

aull incoae

fro«>

his work and lives quite

odestly, having few aaterial possessions.
Motivation
Mr. W seems highly motivated to understand his past.
He is
also highly motivated to ensure that he does not become overly dependent or
involved with me. Thus, keeping him in treatment may be difficult.
:

Diagnostic Hypotheses
Several issues seem to be especially important to
explore.
These include Mr. W's avoidance of complex personal involvements,
constant need for an intense relationship with a woman, difficulties expressing
anger, and feelings of guilt. Exploring the historical roots of these problems,
and helping the client to fully appreciate the role of his early experiences in
the development of his problems, will be quite important.
:
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relatively
negative

6

7

very
negative

approach and/or goali be
In a few aenteocea, what would your therapeutic
your uaual
with thla patient. If they would be in any way different frca
way of working, plaaae deacrlbe.

aake any additional eo
(optional) In the apace provided below, pleaae
rcaponaea. or the taak Itaeli.
you wlah concerning the patient, your

APPENDIX C
DEMOGRAPHIC AND
IDEOLOGY QUESTIONNAIRE

122

123

THERAPIST BACKGROUND INFORMATIOK

Sex

Age

Family of origin religion

ttACK

-

.'

Religion

City and State now living

City and State of origin/

(nation if not US)

Theoretical orientation (check one)
Eclectic
Interpersonal
Existential
Cognitive-behavioral

Psychodynamic
Psychoanalytic
Object Relations
Other (Specify)

Ra t iona 1 -Eao t ive
Humanistic
Behavioral

If you have checked eclectic, please circle the orientation which most Informs
your work.

Political beliefs:

Strongly liberal
Moderately liberal

Moderately conservative
Strongly conservative

None
Other (specify)

Religious beliefs:

Strongly traditional
Moderately traditional

Moderately liberal
Strongly liberal

Agnostic
Atheist

Other (Specify)
Socioeconomic background (i.e., family of origin)

Upper upper class
lo%rer upper class

upper lover class
lower lower class

upper middle class
lower middle class

Sexual orientation:

heterosexual

homosexual

bisexual

other
(specify)

